JSM 2005 Online Program

Abstract #304283

This is the preliminary program for the 2005 Joint Statistical Meetings in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Currently included in this program is the "technical" program, schedule of invited, topic contributed, regular contributed and poster sessions; Continuing Education courses (August 7-10, 2005); and Committee and Business Meetings. This on-line program will be updated frequently to reflect the most current revisions.

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Activity Number:	517
Type:	Contributed
Date/Time:	Thursday, August 11, 2005 : 10:30 AM to 12:20 PM
Sponsor:	Business and Economics Statistics Section
Abstract - #304283
Title:	Why Do People Pay Taxes in China?
Author(s):	Wei Yu*+
Companies:	The University of Texas at Austin
Address:	2501 lake austin blvd E107, Austin, TX, 78703, United States
Keywords:	tax evasion ; game theory ; experimental design ; law enforcement ; tax compliance
Abstract:	This paper describes why people evade taxes from different aspects. It presents a basic framework of the "benefit-cost" analysis; costs include economic cost and psychological cost. It describes the total cost of tax evasion and examines the effects of the various parameters on the cost of evasion. It establishes a game model between taxpayers and tax authority, which takes into account the function of the social factors and information asymmetric. The relationship between taxpayers and tax authority is simulated by experiments. Experiments conduct the effect of tax rate, probability of audit, and fine rate on tax evasion. Finally, a sampling survey is presented and a systematical analysis about the determinants of tax evasion and tax management is made from the following four aspects: taxation, institutional arrangement, taxation enforcement, and the social informal rules.

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