JSM 2005 - Toronto

Abstract #302847

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Legend: = Applied Session, = Theme Session, = Presenter
Activity Number: 398
Type: Contributed
Date/Time: Wednesday, August 10, 2005 : 10:30 AM to 12:20 PM
Sponsor: Biopharmaceutical Section
Abstract - #302847
Title: A Mixed Nash Equilibrium Procedure for Minimizing Selection Bias in Clinical Trials
Author(s): William Grant*+ and Kevin Anstrom and David Crosslin and Kevin Schulman
Companies: Duke University and Duke University and Duke University and Duke University
Address: PO Box 17969, Durham, NC, 27715, United States
Keywords: selection bias ; clinical trials ; confounding ; restricted randomization ; game theory
Abstract:

Clinical trials can be compromised by selection bias, particularly when enrollment is sequential and previous assignments are unmasked. In such contexts, an appropriate randomization procedure minimizes selection bias while satisfying the need for treatment balance. This paper presents optimal policy mechanisms based on noncooperative game theory and the statistics of selection bias. Our model clarifies the representative physician's enrollment preferences so the strategic choices of both the statistician and the physician are optimal. We solve the clinical trial game for a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium procedure for randomization. Using the Nash procedure, the statistician minimizes selection bias given the physician's optimal strategy, and the physician maximizes enrollment preferences given the Nash procedure. We present results for several clinical trial examples that consist of probability distributions on suitable assignment sequences.

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Revised March 2005