Abstract #300518

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JSM 2003 Abstract #300518
Activity Number: 449
Type: Contributed
Date/Time: Thursday, August 7, 2003 : 8:30 AM to 10:20 AM
Sponsor: Social Statistics Section
Abstract - #300518
Title: Counterintuitive Probability in Risk Assessment
Author(s): Sarah Klein*+ and Gary Gadbury
Companies: University of Missouri-Rolla and University of Missouri, Rolla
Address: 2914 E. 77th St., Tulsa, OK, 74136,
Keywords: face-value information ; reporting mechanism ; selective reporting ; Bayes's Rule
Abstract:

Individuals may make "irrational" or incorrect judgments regarding probabilities of events if basing their assessment on face-value information rather than full information. The reporting mechanism, i.e., the method by which the informer selects information to report, is often ignored. Judgments that seem intuitively correct based on the face value information may actually be irrational once the reporting mechanism is incorporated. We show some examples in which the correct conditional probability of an event using full information, including the reporting mechanism, seems counterintuitive. This use of Bayes's Rule in the context of judgments might be a useful technique to help students understand how probabilities relate to decision-making. Moreover, the ideas behind the examples relate to some well-known concepts that have appeared in sociological, economic, and psychological papers on risk reporting and perception. Thus, we relate our simple examples of "biased" judgments to more pertinent probability assessments involving health and monetary risks. Finally, some distinctions between incorrect judgment and incorrect "inference" are drawn.

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