Two-Part Random Effects Models for Longitudinal Cost Data

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#### **Outline of Talk**

- Movitation and Purpose
- Cost-sharing studies
- VA System
- Policy change and sample
- Outcome: VA Specialty Expenditures
- Longitudinal two-part modeling
- Results
- Summary

#### Motivation of the Talk

 Opportunity to apply innovative two-part model to re-examine a VA policy question
 Previously applied uncorrelated longitudinal twopart model

Demonstrate a successful collaboration between biostatistician & health economist

#### **Purpose of Analysis**

Policy question: Were specialty expenditures impacted by a specialty visit copay increase from \$15 to \$50?

– Copay increased in November 2001

- Methods question: Is the probability of positive specialty expenditures related to the level of expenditures over time?
  - Does "naïve" longitudinal two-part model generate different results than correlated twopart model?

### **RAND HIE: Coinsurance Effects & Outpatient Use and Expenditures**


- Compared to free plan, individuals in plans with coinsurance had lower likelihood of use
  - Mental health & medical care
  - Emergency care
  - Preventive care

Compared to free plan, users in plans with coinsurance had lower expenditures

- Mental health care (per episode)
- Medical care (annual)


O'Grady, et al., 1985; Manning, et al., 1986, 1987; Keeler, Manning, Wells 1986

# PPO, HMO & POS Enrollees with Outpatient Visit Copays



2000-2007 Kaiser/HRET Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Benefits

#### Primary Care Visit Copays of PPO Enrollees with Copays



2000-2007 Kaiser/HRET Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Benefits

#### Copay Association w/ Outpatient Services, Visits & Expenditures

Emergency department: Negative - Selby, 1996; Magid, 1997; Reed, 2005; Hsu, 2006 Primary care: Negative (Cherkin, 1989) Mental health/Substance abuse - Pr(use): NS (Simon, 1996), negative (Stein, 2000) - Level: Negative (Simon, 1996; Lo Sasso, 2004,06) Preventive services: NS or negative - Cherkin, 1990; Solanki, 1999 & 2000 Specialty care: NS (Cherkin, 1989)

# Veterans Health Administration

Largest vertically and horizontally integrated health care system in US (2006) – 155 hospitals in 50 states, DC and Puerto Rico - 800+ outpatient clinics & 135 nursing homes 46 residential rehabilitation treatment centers - Over 200 readjustment counseling centers - 5 million users & 54 million outpatient visits Annual budget of \$35 billion in 2007 Divided into 21 regional networks

















Hospital






VISN Boundary State




#### DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS Veterans Health Administration Facilities



### **Timeline of Copay Change**

<u>December 6, 2001</u> *Specialty Care up from \$15 to \$50* Primary Care copay (\$15) introduced



# **Study Design and Data**


#### Study Design

- Retrospective longitudinal cohort (2000-2004) in 4 VAMCs in NW, N & S Central US
- -Non-equivalent, co-located control group

#### Administrative data

- -Outcomes: VA utilization & expenditures
- Covariates: Demographics, diagnoses
- Census: Median income in zip code (2000)

# **Hypertension Cohort Inclusion**



# **Copayment Status Groups**


Group	Copay Status
Control	Priority Group 1: Exempt from VA copays for life
	VA copays for me
?	Priority Groups 2-6: Not clear
	what meds are free (excluded)
Treat-	Priority Group 7 & 8: Must
ment	pay all copays

#### **Descriptive Statistics At Baseline**

Hypertension Cohort	All	Exempt	Must Pay	
	N=7,731	N=4,307	N=3,424	p
VA Medical Center				
#1	979	534	445	
#2	2217	512	1705	
#3	2538	1712	826	
#4	1997	1549	448	<.0001
Marital Status				
Not married (%)	30.3	33.4	26.4	<.0001
Male (%)	97.1	96.8	97.6	
Race				
White (%)	61.0	68.4	51.7	
Non-White (%)	15.4	21.2	8.2	
Unknown (%)	23.5	10.3	40.1	<.0001
	mean (s.d.)	mean (s.d.)	mean (s.d.)	р
Age (2000)	64.5 (11.4)	61.5 (12.0)	68.3 (9.4)	<.0001
DCG (2000)	0.85 (1.22)	1.09 (1.30)	0.55 (1.03)	<.0001
Total num. Rx	8.3 (6.1)	9.8 (6.5)	6.6 (4.9)	<.0001
Total Num. HTN Rx	1.6 (.97)	1.6 (.95)	1.5 (.99)	<.0001

#### Characteristics of Specialty Expenditures, 2000-03

Semicontinuous, longitudinal response variable that is a mixture of zeros and positive values at each year




#### Proportion of Veterans with Specialty Expenditures, 2000-03



# Mean Specialty Expenditures of Users by Copay Status, 2000-03



#### Distribution of Specialty Expenditures for Users



4.5

5.5

6.5

7.5

8.5

9.5

10.5

Percent

4 3


2 1 0

0.5

1.5

2.5

3.5



 Possible solution: fit separate longitudinal models (GEE or mixed effects models) to model each process separately

 "Naïve" or uncorrelated model

Issue: This <u>does not</u> allow presence/absence of expenditure and amount of expenditure to influence one another

# Possible Reasons for Correlation between Probability and Level

Cost-related visit avoidance can exacerbate a condition that will require even more care next year, leading to higher mean costs among users and <u>negative</u> correlation

Specialists may find additional issues that need addressing leading to higher mean costs among users and <u>positive</u> correlation

#### **Two-part random effects model**

- Let Y<sub>ij</sub> = specialty expenditure for patient i, year j
- Recode as
  - $-U_{ij} = 1 \text{ if } Y_{ij} > 0 \text{ or } U_{ij} = 0 \text{ if } Y_{ij} = 0$  $-V_{ii} = \log Y_{ii} \text{ if } Y_{ij} > 0$
- Fit correlated random effects models for
  - Logit probability of  $U_{ij} = 1$
  - Mean response  $E(V_{ij})$  for years where Uij = 1
  - Olsen & Schafer (2001), Tooze (2002)

### **Estimation Methods**

Computational approaches similar to those available for generalized linear mixed models First part involved intractable likelihood Bayesian estimation via MCMC - Computationally intensive (Cooper et al, 2007) Penalized quasi-likelihood - Biased results in GLMM with binary outcome Likelihood approximation – Laplace (Olsen & Schafer, 2001) - Adaptive quadrature (Tooze et al 2002)

# Two-part random effects model: software implementation

#### Olsen & Schafer (2001)

- Uses Laplace approximation to the likelihood
- Fast & flexible (specify>1 random effect per part)
- Stand alone Fortran executable

#### **Tooze (2002)**

- Adaptive quadrature within PROC NLMIXED
- Only allows 1 random effect for each part

Cooper et al (2007) – provides WinBUGS code

 Two-part random effects model of VA specialty expenditures
 1<sup>st</sup> part: Binary outcome of Pr(U<sub>ij</sub> = 1)
 Logistic mixed effects model (PROC NLMIXED)

2<sup>nd</sup> part: Continuous outcome of E(V<sub>ij</sub>|Uij =1)
 – Mixed effect model (PROC MIXED)
 – Log-transformed expenditures

Correlated random intercepts
 – Bivariate normality assumed

#### **Model Specification** Copay status Main effect (MUSTPAY) Interaction between year \* MUSTPAY Year fixed effect dummies (2000=reference) Demographics - Age, Race (white=reference), Marital status Median income in county (2000 Census) Health status at baseline – DCG, Number of medications, Baseline Dx of depression Site fixed effects

#### Impact of Specialty Visit Copay on Odds of Specialty Use

	Uncorrelated Model	Correlated Model
Must pay copay	-1.15 (0.09)***	-1.16 (0.09)***
Must pay * 2001	0.05 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)
Must pay * 2002	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)
Must pay * 2003	0.03 (0.10)	0.04 (0.10)
Year dummy (2001)	0.30 (0.07)***	0.31 (0.07)***
Year dummy (2002)	0.50 (0.07)***	0.49 (0.07)***
Year dummy (2003)	0.27 (0.07)***	0.27 (0.07)***
DCG score in 2000	0.39 (0.04)***	0.37 (0.03)***
# medications in 2000	0.18 (0.01)***	0.17 (0.01)***
Var(Random intercept)	3.11 (0.12)***	3.08 (0.13)***
Log-Likelihood	28182.2	30976.6
AIC	28222.2	30976.6

### Impact of Specialty Visit Copay on Level of Log(Cost) by Users

	Uncorrelated Model	Correlated Model	
Must pay copay	-0.17 (0.04)***	-0.23 (0.04)***	
Must pay * 2001	-0.016 (0.04)	-0.030 (0.04)	
Must pay * 2002	-0.256 (0.04)***	-0.272 (0.04)***	
Must pay * 2003	-0.191 (0.04)***	-0.200 (0.04)***	
Year dummy (2001)	0.05 (0.03)***	0.05 (0.03)	
Year dummy (2002)	0.10 (0.03)***	0.11 (0.03)***	
Year dummy (2003)	0.15 (0.03)***	0.15 (0.03)***	
DCG score in 2000	0.12 (0.01)***	0.14 (0.01)***	
# medications in 2000	0.06 (0.001)***	0.07 (0.001)***	
Var(Random intercept)	0.57 (0.02)***	0.63 (0.02)***	
Covariance		0.96 (0.03)***	
Log-Likelihood	368236.5	78708.4	
AIC	368194.5	78708.4	

### Limitations

Random intercepts only

- Other correlation structures may be more appropriate
- Log transformation: distribution fit here
- Non-equivalent control group
  - Observed variables imbalanced
- Copay effect embeds cross-price effects
  - Same time: Primary care visit copay up from \$0 to \$15
  - 3 months later: Rx copay up from \$2 to \$7
- Limited adjustment of covariates
  - Likely to be unobserved confounding
- For last two reasons, policy implication must be interpreted cautiously

# **Policy Conclusion**

Specialty visit copay increase had

- No impact on whether to seek specialty care
- Significant impact on specialty expenditures for those who used specialty care <u>and</u> had to pay the copay in two years following copay increase

Appears to be driven by fewer visits, not lower cost per visit

### **Methods Conclusion**

 With random intercepts, the probability is related to the level of expenditures over time
 – Covariance of 0.96 = correlation of 0.68

Correlated two-part model results were fairly similar to point estimates of uncorrelated model

 Not necessarily a general result given limited number of covariates **Questions?**